OrNetStats

OrNetStats shows you statistics about the Tor network.

Tor network data as of: 2019-10-18 14:00 UTC

Tor Relay Operators in End-to-End Correlation Position

The following table lists relay operators that are in a position to see a tor client’s entry and exit connections. In the worst-case a tor client would use these groups as entry (guard) and exit relay at the same time.

Operators are only listed if they actually have a chance to do end-to-end correlation attacks, that is:

This list might contain false-positives as ContactInfo is not authenticated.

The ContactInfo is truncated. Middle-only relays are not included in per-group relaycounts.

The table is sorted by guard probability.

Contact Guard (%) Exit (%) #Relays /16 Netblocks Newest Relay Eff. Family Members (min)
abuse-node49 AT posteo DOT de 0.29 0.29 10 5 2019-10-17 1
runtime-error at riseup dot net 0.1 0.2 3 3 2019-07-19 1
Steven S <katsalmovies@gmail.com> 0.06 0.22 3 2 2019-10-04 1
bobs.house AT mail.ru 36j52chsdz962ivcpN1xfPXkJz 0.05 0.11 4 3 2019-09-29 1
$ CONTACT GPG FINGERPRINT $ CONTACT NAME $ CONTA 0.02 0.05 2 2 2019-09-07 1
Total 0.52 0.87 22      

For a detailed list of (known) relays in end-to-end correlation position see this page.

NOTE: There are many more relays with MyFamily configuration issues but most operate exit or guard relays exclusively or within a single /16 network block. Such operators can not become the first and last hop of your tor circuits, but they might be able to reveal your guard relay (when they act as the middle and exit relay in a single circuit).

Biggest Relay Families on the Tor Network

Relays are aggregated based on effective families. Effective families are relays with a mutually configured MyFamily setting. Single relays (without family) are also considered but not aggregated. The first column usually shows the contact information, or if no contact information was provided, the first 8 characters of the relay fingerprint.

Top 10 Exit Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Exit(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 17 42 2016-01-25
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 8.54 12 2018-03-23
John L. Ricketts, PhD <john AT quintex dot com> 6.4 50 2016-08-22
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 5.57 17 2016-12-23
tech@emeraldonion.org 5.06 55 2019-04-05
Nicholas Merrill <nick AT calyx dot com> BTC - 14w 3.15 13 2013-06-11
F3 Netze <abuse@f3netze.de> 3.04 8 2018-03-21
https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ 2.57 13 2015-05-22
Hart voor Internetvrijheid <abuse AT hartvoorinter 2.18 15 2014-04-09
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 1.92 12 2017-12-05

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Top 10 Guard Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
<tor AT afo MINUS tm DOT org> 2 14 2018-10-05
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 1.92 22 2019-01-05
Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d 1.02 8 2016-01-03
retik.eu <retik@systemli.org> 0.98 7 2018-09-25
abuse AT for-privacy.net 0.95 8 2019-04-15
24F97F98 0.88 5 2016-09-06
0ED0EA32 0.81 5 2017-10-24
Gijs Rijnders tor AT ip-eend DOT nl 0.76 3 2015-04-22
63540827 0.71 2 2018-12-12
Kevin Hicks <admin@fissionrelays.net> 0.61 12 2018-01-07

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Top 10 Relay Families by Consensus Weight

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 5.313 17 1.92 64 2016-01-25
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 2.429 8.54 0.59 19 2017-06-13
John L. Ricketts, PhD <john AT quintex dot com> 1.528 6.4 0 50 2016-08-22
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 1.329 5.57 0 17 2016-12-23
<tor AT afo MINUS tm DOT org> 1.314 0 2 14 2018-10-05
tech@emeraldonion.org 1.219 5.06 0.01 56 2019-04-05
Nicholas Merrill <nick AT calyx dot com> BTC - 14w 0.779 3.15 0.03 14 2013-06-11
F3 Netze <abuse@f3netze.de> 0.727 3.04 0 8 2018-03-21
Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d 0.673 0 1.02 8 2016-01-03
retik.eu <retik@systemli.org> 0.642 0 0.98 7 2018-09-25

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Top 10 Autonomous System Names by CW Fraction

AS Name CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
Hetzner Online GmbH 15.6 20.24 0.08 376
OVH SAS 12.63 16.45 5.07 492
Online S.a.s. 8.92 11.48 3.13 278
Joshua Peter McQuistan 4.42 0.56 17 46
netcup GmbH 2.8 3.75 0.11 94
myLoc managed IT AG 2.54 3.25 1.05 41
Foundation for Applied Privacy 2.33 0.45 8.54 16
FranTech Solutions 1.98 0.85 5.22 81
Quintex Alliance Consulting 1.52 0 6.4 50
SURFnet bv 1.51 1.51 2.18 30

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Tor Version Distribution (Relays)

Major Versions

Tor Version CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
0.4.1 48.7 68.8 42.58 2443
0.3.5 23.1 9.43 26.47 1756
0.4.0 16.2 12.75 18.22 743
0.2.9 6 2.69 6.41 689
0.4.2 4.9 6.12 5.24 112
0.3.4 0.7 0.16 0.97 55
0.2.4 0 0 0 13
0.2.5 0 0 0 4
0.2.7 0 0 0 1
0.3.0 0 0 0 10
0.3.1 0 0 0 3
0.3.2 0 0.04 0 8
0.3.3 0 0 0 2
0.4.3 0 0 0.1 4

A version-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

Complete list of Tor Versions

End-of-Life Relays Share

The following table shows how many relays run a tor version that is no longer supported.

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
0.82 0.97 0.21 96

Show all relays running unsupported tor releases

OS Distribution (Relays)

OS CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
Linux 89.7 83.4 91.5 5247
BSD 9.9 16.5 8.1 442
Windows 0.1 0 0.1 43
SunOS 0 0 0.1 6
Darwin 0 0 0 8

A OS-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

IPv6 Relay Stats

What cw fraction / guard/middle/exit probability has an IPv6 ORPort?

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Middle(%) Exit(%) #Relays
32.15 30.24 27.71 42.28 1117

What exit probability allows IPv6 exiting?

Exit(%) #Exit Relays
43.49 301

Bridge Stats

Bridge Transports Distribution

Supported Transports Bridges
obfs4 707
None 411
obfs3, obfs4 80
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, websocket 21
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 6
meek 6
obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 5
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4 4
fte, meek, obfs3, obfs4 2
obfs3 2
fte, obfs3 1
fte, obfs3, scramblesuit 1
fte, obfs4 1
meek, meek 1
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 1
obfs3, scramblesuit 1
websocket 1

Data Source

OrNetStats uses public data provided by The Tor Project: