OrNetStats

OrNetStats shows you statistics about the Tor network.

Tor network data as of: 2018-04-23 10:00 UTC

Tor Relay Operators in End-to-End Correlation Position

The following table lists relay operators that are in a position to see a tor client’s entry and exit connections. In the worst-case a tor client would use these groups as entry (guard) and exit relay at the same time.

Operators are only listed if they actually have a chance to do end-to-end correlation attacks, that is:

This list might contain false-positives as ContactInfo is not authenticated.

The ContactInfo is truncated. Middle-only relays are not included in per-group relaycounts.

The table is sorted by guard probability.

Contact Guard (%) Exit (%) #Relays /16 Netblocks Newest Relay Eff. Family Members (min)
VSIF Support <support AT vsif dot ca> 0.05 0.1 7 2 2018-02-11 4
<hostmaster at denetron dot com> 0.04 0.08 3 2 2016-08-28 1
Admin aT yggdrasil<-dOt===>ws 0.04 0.31 2 2 2018-04-13 1
Digineo GmbH <tor AT digineo dot de> 0.03 0.31 2 2 2017-02-16 1
Total 0.16 0.80 14      

For a detailed list of (known) relays in end-to-end correlation position see this page.

NOTE: There are many more relays with MyFamily configuration issues but most operate exit or guard relays exclusively or within a single /16 network block. Such operators can not become the first and last hop of your tor circuits, but they might be able to reveal your guard relay (when they act as the middle and exit relay in a single circuit).

Biggest Relay Families on the Tor Network

Relays are aggregated based on effective families. Effective families are relays with a mutually configured MyFamily setting. Single relays (without family) are also considered but not aggregated. The first column usually shows the contact information, or if no contact information was provided, the first 8 characters of the relay fingerprint.

Top 10 Exit Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Exit(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 10.78 27 2016-01-25
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 6.08 13 2016-12-23
tor@ipredator.se - 1Q3mjKbZwZFEigC8edUZ8ywX4QD7kxF 2.85 1 2014-04-19
Viktor <vnikolov AT vnikolov dot cz> 2.78 6 2017-11-29
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 2.55 11 2017-12-05
0x02225522 Frenn vun der Enn FVDE <info AT enn D 2.47 7 2014-04-09
https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ 2.3 8 2013-07-10
0x9F29C15D42A8B6F3 Nos oignons <adminsys@nos-oigno 1.96 6 2014-04-08
zcashtorservers.org supported by a z.cash.foundati 1.76 4 2018-01-31
justaguy justaguy@justaguy.be 15nfFZYTJx5Zt24TqQb2 1.69 2 2018-02-24

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Top 10 Guard Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
tor at 0x3d dot lu - 1x3dG3utS7FDrTtJutnR3zuCo4Z8f 1.88 7 2014-04-22
Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d 1.05 7 2016-01-03
https://onioncount.github.io/ https://onionpop.g 0.94 6 2016-08-10
GTor <contact AT gtor DOT org> 0.91 8 2015-01-29
Felix <zwiebel ta quantentunnel tod de> 0.86 17 2015-05-16
0ED0EA32 0.74 5 2017-10-24
Servbr Admin <servbr AT mail DOT md> 0.64 9 2017-02-08
TotorBE AT gmail DOT com 0.62 2 2016-10-22
Kevin Hicks <admin@fissionrelays.net> 0.58 7 2018-01-07
<roottor00@multivac.io> - 1LLnvMu2s4BaF2LmsqV8Ruw 0.57 1 2014-04-08

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Top 10 Relay Families by Consensus Weight

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 2.66 10.78 0 27 2016-01-25
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 1.502 6.08 0 13 2016-12-23
tor at 0x3d dot lu - 1x3dG3utS7FDrTtJutnR3zuCo4Z8f 1.205 0 1.88 7 2014-04-22
Viktor <vnikolov AT vnikolov dot cz> 0.81 2.78 0.19 8 2016-01-26
tor@ipredator.se - 1Q3mjKbZwZFEigC8edUZ8ywX4QD7kxF 0.703 2.85 0 1 2014-04-19
Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d 0.674 0 1.05 7 2016-01-03
https://onioncount.github.io/ https://onionpop.g 0.658 0.21 0.94 7 2016-08-10
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 0.63 2.55 0 11 2017-12-05
0x02225522 Frenn vun der Enn FVDE <info AT enn D 0.61 2.47 0 7 2014-04-09
GTor <contact AT gtor DOT org> 0.585 0 0.91 8 2015-01-29

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Top 10 Autonomous System Names by CW Fraction

AS Name CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
Online S.a.s. 13.55 14.97 14.12 372
OVH SAS 13.36 15.78 8.5 530
Hetzner Online GmbH 7.04 8.78 1.41 340
DigitalOcean, LLC 5.27 6.84 0.85 297
Joshua Peter McQuistan 2.7 0 10.78 29
Digital Ocean, Inc. 1.97 1.57 1.66 51
NForce Entertainment B.V. 1.82 0.07 7.03 23
Host Europe GmbH 1.74 2.58 0.24 35
myLoc managed IT AG 1.47 2.07 0.53 34
netcup GmbH 1.24 1.59 0.37 41

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Tor Version Distribution (Relays)

Major Versions

Tor Version CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
0.3.2 60 66.53 60.02 2912
0.2.9 13.9 7.38 14.93 1287
0.3.3 10.5 15.48 10.05 317
0.3.1 8.1 5.28 8.23 768
0.2.5 3.2 2.71 3.09 455
0.2.4 1.3 0.97 1.41 256
0.3.0 1 0.04 1.15 179
0.2.7 0.7 0.04 0.62 173
0.3.4 0.7 1.63 0.33 13
0.2.8 0.1 0.01 0.1 39
0.2.6 0 0.01 0.04 27

A version-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

Complete list of Tor Versions

End-of-Life Relays Share

The following table shows how many relays run a tor version that is no longer supported.

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
3.31 3.33 1.09 674

Show all relays running unsupported tor releases

OS Distribution (Relays)

OS CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
Linux 90.8 91.3 89.7 5936
BSD 8.8 8.8 9.9 343
Windows 0.2 0 0.1 100
SunOS 0 0 0.1 3
Darwin 0 0 0 15

A OS-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

IPv6 Relay Stats

What cw fraction / guard/middle/exit probability has an IPv6 ORPort?

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Middle(%) Exit(%) #Relays
22.9 23.33 19.92 26.79 753

What exit probability allows IPv6 exiting?

Exit(%) #Exit Relays
29.84 156

Bridge Stats

Bridge Transports Distribution

Supported Transports Bridges
obfs4 919
None 590
obfs3, obfs4 63
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, websocket 21
obfs3 16
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4 9
obfs2, obfs3 8
obfs3, scramblesuit 8
obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 7
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 5
meek 4
fte, obfs3, obfs4 3
obfs4, scramblesuit 2
fte, meek, meek, obfs3, scramblesuit 1
fte, obfs3 1
fte, obfs4, websocket 1
meek, meek 1
meek, obfs4 1
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 1
websocket 1

Data Source

OrNetStats uses public data provided by The Tor Project: