OrNetStats
Stats about the Tor Network
OrNetStats shows you statistics about the Tor network.
Tor network data as of: 2019-12-05 20:00 UTC
The following table lists relay operators that are in a position to see a tor client’s entry and exit connections. In the worst-case a tor client would use these groups as entry (guard) and exit relay at the same time.
Operators are only listed if they actually have a chance to do end-to-end correlation attacks, that is:
This list might contain false-positives as ContactInfo is not authenticated.
The ContactInfo is truncated. Middle-only relays are not included in per-group relaycounts.
The table is sorted by guard probability.
| Contact | Guard (%) | Exit (%) | #Relays | /16 Netblocks | Newest Relay | Eff. Family Members (min) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| bobs.house AT mail.ru 36j52chsdz962ivcpN1xfPXkJz | 0.32 | 0.25 | 7 | 2 | 2019-11-13 | 1 |
| abuse-node49 AT posteo DOT de | 0.17 | 0.37 | 11 | 6 | 2019-12-05 | 4 |
| runtime-error at riseup dot net | 0.09 | 0.15 | 3 | 3 | 2019-07-19 | 1 |
| Steven S <katsalmovies@gmail.com> | 0.04 | 0.18 | 3 | 2 | 2019-10-04 | 1 |
| Total | 0.62 | 0.95 | 24 |
For a detailed list of (known) relays in end-to-end correlation position see this page.
NOTE: There are many more relays with MyFamily configuration issues but most operate exit or guard relays exclusively or within a single /16 network block. Such operators can not become the first and last hop of your tor circuits, but they might be able to reveal your guard relay (when they act as the middle and exit relay in a single circuit).
Relays are aggregated based on effective families. Effective families are relays with a mutually configured MyFamily setting. Single relays (without family) are also considered but not aggregated. The first column usually shows the contact information, or if no contact information was provided, the first 8 characters of the relay fingerprint.
| Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) | Exit(%) | #Relays | First Seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net | 16.6 | 50 | 2016-01-25 |
| Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp | 7.55 | 12 | 2018-03-23 |
| John L. Ricketts, PhD <john AT quintex dot com> | 5.7 | 50 | 2016-08-22 |
| https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A | 5.44 | 17 | 2016-12-23 |
| F3 Netze <abuse@f3netze.de> | 3.99 | 8 | 2018-03-21 |
| Nicholas Merrill <nick AT calyx dot com> BTC - 14w | 3.67 | 13 | 2013-06-11 |
| tech@emeraldonion.org | 3.56 | 54 | 2019-04-05 |
| https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ | 2.65 | 13 | 2015-05-22 |
| Hart voor Internetvrijheid <abuse AT hartvoorinter | 2.32 | 15 | 2014-04-09 |
| Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> | 2.11 | 12 | 2017-12-05 |
| Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) | Guard(%) | #Relays | First Seen |
|---|---|---|---|
| <tor AT afo MINUS tm DOT org> | 1.98 | 14 | 2018-10-05 |
| abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net | 1.61 | 17 | 2019-01-05 |
| Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d | 0.94 | 7 | 2016-01-03 |
| abuse AT for-privacy.net | 0.9 | 10 | 2019-03-16 |
| retik.eu <retik@systemli.org> | 0.86 | 6 | 2018-09-25 |
| 24F97F98 | 0.8 | 5 | 2016-09-06 |
| 0ED0EA32 | 0.71 | 5 | 2017-10-24 |
| torrpi1405@gmail.com | 0.69 | 20 | 2018-08-28 |
| email:tor appliedprivacy.net twitter:applied priv | 0.65 | 7 | 2017-06-13 |
| Kevin Hicks <admin@fissionrelays.net> | 0.65 | 12 | 2018-01-07 |
| Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) | CW Fraction(%) | Exit(%) | Guard(%) | #Relays | First Seen |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net | 5.26 | 16.6 | 1.61 | 68 | 2016-01-25 |
| Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp | 2.34 | 7.55 | 0.65 | 19 | 2017-06-13 |
| John L. Ricketts, PhD <john AT quintex dot com> | 1.449 | 5.7 | 0 | 50 | 2016-08-22 |
| https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A | 1.383 | 5.44 | 0 | 17 | 2016-12-23 |
| <tor AT afo MINUS tm DOT org> | 1.271 | 0 | 1.98 | 14 | 2018-10-05 |
| F3 Netze <abuse@f3netze.de> | 1.015 | 3.99 | 0 | 8 | 2018-03-21 |
| Nicholas Merrill <nick AT calyx dot com> BTC - 14w | 0.961 | 3.67 | 0.04 | 14 | 2013-06-11 |
| tech@emeraldonion.org | 0.917 | 3.56 | 0.01 | 55 | 2019-04-05 |
| Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d | 0.678 | 0 | 0.94 | 8 | 2016-01-03 |
| https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ | 0.676 | 2.65 | 0 | 13 | 2015-05-22 |
| AS Name | CW Fraction(%) | Guard(%) | Exit(%) | #Relays |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hetzner Online GmbH | 16.32 | 21.58 | 0.11 | 416 |
| OVH SAS | 12.41 | 15.54 | 7.54 | 529 |
| Online S.a.s. | 8.23 | 11.36 | 2.44 | 268 |
| Joshua Peter McQuistan | 4.62 | 0.33 | 16.6 | 54 |
| netcup GmbH | 2.64 | 3.49 | 0.17 | 114 |
| myLoc managed IT AG | 2.36 | 3.19 | 1.11 | 45 |
| Foundation for Applied Privacy | 2.25 | 0.52 | 7.55 | 16 |
| FranTech Solutions | 1.97 | 1.13 | 4.73 | 77 |
| Iomart Cloud Services Limited | 1.46 | 2.29 | 0 | 20 |
| Quintex Alliance Consulting | 1.44 | 0 | 5.7 | 50 |
| Tor Version | CW Fraction(%) | Exit(%) | Guard(%) | #Relays |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.4.1 | 57.4 | 75.4 | 52.02 | 3208 |
| 0.3.5 | 19.3 | 7.6 | 22.55 | 1650 |
| 0.4.0 | 11.5 | 7.8 | 13.13 | 521 |
| 0.4.2 | 5.5 | 5.66 | 6.13 | 152 |
| 0.2.9 | 5 | 2.36 | 5.36 | 632 |
| 0.3.4 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 0.66 | 59 |
| 0.2.5 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0 | 12 |
| 0.3.2 | 0.1 | 0.34 | 0.06 | 24 |
| 0.2.4 | 0 | 0.05 | 0 | 15 |
| 0.2.6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| 0.2.7 | 0 | 0.31 | 0 | 2 |
| 0.2.8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
| 0.3.0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| 0.3.1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 |
| 0.3.3 | 0 | 0.15 | 0 | 7 |
| 0.4.3 | 0 | 0 | 0.07 | 14 |
A version-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page
The following table shows how many relays run a tor version that is no longer supported.
| CW Fraction(%) | Guard(%) | Exit(%) | #Relays |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.93 | 0.72 | 1.17 | 140 |
Show all relays running unsupported tor releases
| OS | CW Fraction(%) | Exit(%) | Guard(%) | #Relays |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | 90.4 | 85.4 | 91.5 | 5757 |
| BSD | 9.3 | 14.5 | 8.2 | 453 |
| Windows | 0.1 | 0 | 0.1 | 41 |
| SunOS | 0 | 0 | 0.1 | 5 |
| Darwin | 0 | 0 | 0 | 9 |
A OS-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page
| CW Fraction(%) | Guard(%) | Middle(%) | Exit(%) | #Relays |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 30.71 | 28.38 | 27.69 | 38.58 | 1171 |
| Exit(%) | #Exit Relays |
|---|---|
| 39.54 | 309 |
| Supported Transports | Bridges |
|---|---|
| obfs4 | 740 |
| None | 413 |
| obfs3, obfs4 | 67 |
| fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, websocket | 20 |
| fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit | 6 |
| obfs2, obfs3, obfs4 | 6 |
| meek | 5 |
| obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit | 4 |
| fte, meek, obfs3, obfs4 | 2 |
| obfs3 | 2 |
| fte, obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit | 1 |
| fte, obfs3 | 1 |
| fte, obfs3, scramblesuit | 1 |
| fte, obfs4 | 1 |
| meek, meek | 1 |
| obfs2, obfs3 | 1 |
| obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit | 1 |
| obfs3, scramblesuit | 1 |
| websocket | 1 |
OrNetStats uses public data provided by The Tor Project: