OrNetStats

OrNetStats shows you statistics about the Tor network.

Tor network data as of: 2019-02-16 07:00 UTC

Tor Relay Operators in End-to-End Correlation Position

The following table lists relay operators that are in a position to see a tor client’s entry and exit connections. In the worst-case a tor client would use these groups as entry (guard) and exit relay at the same time.

Operators are only listed if they actually have a chance to do end-to-end correlation attacks, that is:

This list might contain false-positives as ContactInfo is not authenticated.

The ContactInfo is truncated. Middle-only relays are not included in per-group relaycounts.

The table is sorted by guard probability.

Contact Guard (%) Exit (%) #Relays /16 Netblocks Newest Relay Eff. Family Members (min)
tor-operator@your-emailaddress-domain 0.21 0.13 7 7 2018-12-23 1
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 0.09 2.14 13 2 2019-02-13 1
<hostmaster at denetron dot com> 0.02 0.04 2 2 2016-08-28 1
Jelle Jansen <tormail@gigawebs.net> 0.02 0.02 3 3 2019-01-09 2
Total 0.34 2.33 25      

For a detailed list of (known) relays in end-to-end correlation position see this page.

NOTE: There are many more relays with MyFamily configuration issues but most operate exit or guard relays exclusively or within a single /16 network block. Such operators can not become the first and last hop of your tor circuits, but they might be able to reveal your guard relay (when they act as the middle and exit relay in a single circuit).

Biggest Relay Families on the Tor Network

Relays are aggregated based on effective families. Effective families are relays with a mutually configured MyFamily setting. Single relays (without family) are also considered but not aggregated. The first column usually shows the contact information, or if no contact information was provided, the first 8 characters of the relay fingerprint.

Top 10 Exit Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Exit(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 15.94 46 2016-01-25
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 6.99 17 2016-12-23
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 6.3 8 2018-04-05
https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ 2.99 13 2015-05-22
tor-operator@privateinternetaccess.com 2.4 5 2018-12-11
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 2.14 12 2017-12-05
tor@ipredator.se - 1Q3mjKbZwZFEigC8edUZ8ywX4QD7kxF 2.01 1 2014-04-19
0x9F29C15D42A8B6F3 Nos oignons <adminsys@nos-oigno 1.64 7 2014-04-08
Privacy Republic <abuse-team at PrivacyRepublic 1.63 4 2014-11-21
abuse AT torworld.org - BTC 34yFiqwbcUA5MYSvUcpj 1.48 5 2019-01-17

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Top 10 Guard Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 1.13 12 2017-06-13
Kevin Hicks <admin@fissionrelays.net> 0.92 13 2018-01-07
<tor AT afo MINUS tm DOT org> 0.88 11 2018-01-31
24F97F98 0.87 4 2018-08-17
abuse AT torworld.org - BTC 34yFiqwbcUA5MYSvUcpj 0.84 14 2016-12-11
Felix <zwiebel ta quantentunnel tod de> 0.8 15 2015-05-16
0ED0EA32 0.69 5 2017-10-24
Gijs Rijnders tor AT ip-eend DOT nl 0.69 3 2015-04-22
Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d 0.65 8 2016-01-03
torrpi1405@gmail.com 0.59 15 2018-08-28

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Top 10 Relay Families by Consensus Weight

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 3.82 15.94 0.53 61 2016-01-25
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 2.108 6.3 1.13 20 2017-06-13
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 1.526 6.99 0 17 2016-12-23
abuse AT torworld.org - BTC 34yFiqwbcUA5MYSvUcpj 0.973 1.48 0.84 21 2016-10-28
https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ 0.654 2.99 0 13 2015-05-22
24F97F98 0.639 0 0.87 5 2016-09-06
Felix <zwiebel ta quantentunnel tod de> 0.624 0 0.8 19 2015-05-16
Kevin Hicks <admin@fissionrelays.net> 0.596 0 0.92 13 2018-01-07
<tor AT afo MINUS tm DOT org> 0.592 0 0.88 12 2018-01-31
tor-operator@privateinternetaccess.com 0.525 2.4 0 5 2018-12-11

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Top 10 Autonomous System Names by CW Fraction

AS Name CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
OVH SAS 14.49 17.61 10.06 575
Hetzner Online GmbH 12.54 14.92 0.34 415
Online S.a.s. 11.59 13.77 5.89 350
Joshua Peter McQuistan 3.7 0.43 15.7 48
netcup GmbH 2.56 3.09 0.15 78
Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH 2 0.96 6.3 17
DigitalOcean, LLC 1.99 2.05 0.59 245
iomart Cloud Services Limited. 1.54 2.12 0 21
myLoc managed IT AG 1.52 1.87 0.17 38
SURFnet bv 1.35 1.21 2.54 25

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Tor Version Distribution (Relays)

Major Versions

Tor Version CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
0.3.5 36.6 41.25 34.87 2117
0.3.4 29.5 22.31 33.53 1639
0.2.9 11.6 7.06 11.77 1132
0.3.3 9.9 17.7 7.72 506
0.4.0 5.4 9.19 4.32 164
0.3.2 4.2 1.58 5.3 258
0.2.5 0.9 0.23 0.75 154
0.3.1 0.8 0.31 1.1 80
0.2.4 0.3 0.3 0.13 150
0.3.0 0.2 0 0.31 60
0.2.7 0.1 0.02 0.05 94
0.2.6 0 0 0.03 17
0.2.8 0 0 0.05 19
0.3.6 0 0 0 1

A version-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

Complete list of Tor Versions

End-of-Life Relays Share

The following table shows how many relays run a tor version that is no longer supported.

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
6.83 7.76 2.46 833

Show all relays running unsupported tor releases

OS Distribution (Relays)

OS CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
Linux 91 86.1 91.9 5865
BSD 8.4 13.3 7.7 383
Windows 0.2 0.4 0 85
SunOS 0.1 0 0.1 5
Darwin 0 0 0 15

A OS-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

IPv6 Relay Stats

What cw fraction / guard/middle/exit probability has an IPv6 ORPort?

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Middle(%) Exit(%) #Relays
24.35 23.99 23.17 27.09 961

What exit probability allows IPv6 exiting?

Exit(%) #Exit Relays
30.47 187

Bridge Stats

Bridge Transports Distribution

Supported Transports Bridges
obfs4 428
None 379
obfs3, obfs4 52
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, websocket 22
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4 7
obfs3 6
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 5
meek 5
obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 3
fte, meek, obfs3, obfs4 2
obfs2, obfs3 2
obfs3, scramblesuit 2
fte, meek, meek, obfs3, scramblesuit 1
fte, obfs3 1
fte, obfs3, scramblesuit 1
fte, obfs4 1
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 1
websocket 1

Data Source

OrNetStats uses public data provided by The Tor Project: