OrNetStats

OrNetStats shows you statistics about the Tor network.

Tor network data as of: 2018-10-18 10:00 UTC

Tor Relay Operators in End-to-End Correlation Position

The following table lists relay operators that are in a position to see a tor client’s entry and exit connections. In the worst-case a tor client would use these groups as entry (guard) and exit relay at the same time.

Operators are only listed if they actually have a chance to do end-to-end correlation attacks, that is:

This list might contain false-positives as ContactInfo is not authenticated.

The ContactInfo is truncated. Middle-only relays are not included in per-group relaycounts.

The table is sorted by guard probability.

Contact Guard (%) Exit (%) #Relays /16 Netblocks Newest Relay Eff. Family Members (min)
tor-operator@your-emailaddress-domain 0.1 0.14 5 5 2018-09-25 1
<hostmaster at denetron dot com> 0.04 0.12 3 2 2016-08-28 1
<nobody AT example dot com> 0.02 0.07 2 2 2018-05-21 1
Total 0.16 0.33 10      

For a detailed list of (known) relays in end-to-end correlation position see this page.

NOTE: There are many more relays with MyFamily configuration issues but most operate exit or guard relays exclusively or within a single /16 network block. Such operators can not become the first and last hop of your tor circuits, but they might be able to reveal your guard relay (when they act as the middle and exit relay in a single circuit).

Biggest Relay Families on the Tor Network

Relays are aggregated based on effective families. Effective families are relays with a mutually configured MyFamily setting. Single relays (without family) are also considered but not aggregated. The first column usually shows the contact information, or if no contact information was provided, the first 8 characters of the relay fingerprint.

Top 10 Exit Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Exit(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 8.39 27 2016-01-25
John L. Ricketts, PhD <john AT quintex dot com> 3.56 50 2016-08-22
0x02225522 Frenn vun der Enn FVDE <info AT enn D 3.09 7 2014-04-09
https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ 3.07 11 2017-02-02
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 2.39 7 2016-12-23
tor@ipredator.se - 1Q3mjKbZwZFEigC8edUZ8ywX4QD7kxF 2.36 1 2014-04-19
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 2.29 11 2017-12-05
Privacy Republic <abuse-team at PrivacyRepublic 2.23 4 2014-11-21
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 1.92 2 2018-04-05
Hart voor Internetvrijheid <abuse AT hartvoorinter 1.64 7 2018-04-25

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Top 10 Guard Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 1.97 18 2017-06-13
tor at 0x3d dot lu - 1x3dG3utS7FDrTtJutnR3zuCo4Z8f 1.46 7 2014-04-22
Gijs Rijnders tor AT ip-eend DOT nl 0.87 3 2015-04-22
0ED0EA32 0.82 5 2017-10-24
GTor <contact AT gtor DOT org> 0.82 8 2015-01-29
Peter Pan <peterpan@fscore.de> 0.81 3 2018-04-22
Felix <zwiebel ta quantentunnel tod de> 0.78 17 2015-05-16
TotorBE AT gmail DOT com 0.7 2 2016-10-22
Thomas Steen Rasmussen / Tykling <thomas@gibfest.d 0.66 6 2016-01-03
Servbr Admin <servbr AT mail DOT md> 0.62 9 2017-02-08

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Top 10 Relay Families by Consensus Weight

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 2.246 8.39 0 27 2016-01-25
Foundation for Applied Privacy email:tor appliedp 1.645 1.92 1.97 20 2017-06-13
John L. Ricketts, PhD <john AT quintex dot com> 0.953 3.56 0 50 2016-08-22
tor at 0x3d dot lu - 1x3dG3utS7FDrTtJutnR3zuCo4Z8f 0.84 0 1.46 7 2014-04-22
https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ 0.832 3.07 0.01 12 2013-08-22
0x02225522 Frenn vun der Enn FVDE <info AT enn D 0.827 3.09 0 7 2014-04-09
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 0.64 2.39 0 7 2016-12-23
tor@ipredator.se - 1Q3mjKbZwZFEigC8edUZ8ywX4QD7kxF 0.631 2.36 0 1 2014-04-19
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 0.615 2.29 0 11 2017-12-05
Privacy Republic <abuse-team at PrivacyRepublic 0.597 2.23 0 4 2014-11-21

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Top 10 Autonomous System Names by CW Fraction

AS Name CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
Online S.a.s. 13.64 17.35 7.54 353
OVH SAS 13.59 16.97 10.67 556
Hetzner Online GmbH 9.21 9.37 0.47 371
Joshua Peter McQuistan 2.98 0.89 8.91 33
myLoc managed IT AG 2.23 2.49 2.05 43
SURFnet bv 1.88 1.49 3.8 24
Next Layer Telekommunikationsdienstleistungs- und Beratungs GmbH 1.51 1.74 1.92 17
FranTech Solutions 1.38 1.02 2.61 39
Host Europe GmbH 1.34 2.15 0 39
Private Layer INC 1.26 0.66 2.83 45

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Tor Version Distribution (Relays)

Major Versions

Tor Version CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
0.3.4 48.6 58.49 46.38 2280
0.3.3 21.2 26.84 19.35 1419
0.2.9 14.8 6.84 16.67 1346
0.3.2 8.3 3.2 10.87 506
0.3.5 2.6 2.56 3.19 88
0.3.1 1.3 0.73 1.5 148
0.2.5 1.1 0.69 0.9 211
0.2.4 0.9 0.52 0.39 180
0.2.7 0.4 0.03 0.34 137
0.3.0 0.2 0.03 0.23 74
0.2.6 0 0.01 0.05 25
0.2.8 0 0 0.07 30
0.3.6 0 0 0 1

A version-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

Complete list of Tor Versions

End-of-Life Relays Share

The following table shows how many relays run a tor version that is no longer supported.

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
12.61 14.39 5.25 1312

Show all relays running unsupported tor releases

OS Distribution (Relays)

OS CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
Linux 90.1 86.5 90.3 5900
BSD 9.3 12.7 9.3 403
Windows 0.3 0.6 0 87
SunOS 0.1 0 0.1 5
Darwin 0 0 0 11

A OS-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

IPv6 Relay Stats

What cw fraction / guard/middle/exit probability has an IPv6 ORPort?

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Middle(%) Exit(%) #Relays
26.07 23.79 25.66 29.77 901

What exit probability allows IPv6 exiting?

Exit(%) #Exit Relays
32.16 197

Bridge Stats

Bridge Transports Distribution

Supported Transports Bridges
obfs4 417
None 320
obfs3, obfs4 49
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, websocket 21
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4 9
obfs3 7
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 5
obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 3
fte, meek, obfs3, obfs4 2
fte, obfs3, obfs4 2
fte, meek, meek, obfs3, scramblesuit 1
fte, obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 1
fte, obfs3 1
fte, obfs4 1
fte, obfs4, websocket 1
meek 1
obfs2, obfs3 1
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 1
obfs3, scramblesuit 1
obfs4, scramblesuit 1

Data Source

OrNetStats uses public data provided by The Tor Project: