OrNetStats

OrNetStats shows you statistics about the Tor network.

Tor network data as of: 2018-01-21 08:00 UTC

Tor Relay Operators in End-to-End Correlation Position

The following table lists relay operators that are in a position to see a tor client’s entry and exit connections. In the worst-case a tor client would use these groups as entry (guard) and exit relay at the same time.

Operators are only listed if they actually have a chance to do end-to-end correlation attacks, that is:

This list might contain false-positives as ContactInfo is not authenticated.

The ContactInfo is truncated. Middle-only relays are not included in per-group relaycounts.

The table is sorted by guard probability.

Contact Guard (%) Exit (%) #Relays /16 Netblocks Newest Relay Eff. Family Members (min)
<hostmaster at denetron dot com> 0.12 0.2 3 2 2016-08-28 1
Nicholas Merrill <nick AT calyx dot com> BTC - 14w 0.1 0.77 11 2 2016-04-01 4
- 0.07 0.26 2 2 2018-01-02 1
Digineo GmbH <tor AT digineo dot de> 0.03 0.25 2 2 2017-02-16 1
tor-mngr AT scalaire DOT fr 0.02 0.2 2 2 2017-11-27 1
Total 0.34 1.68 20      

For a detailed list of (known) relays in end-to-end correlation position see this page.

NOTE: There are many more relays with MyFamily configuration issues but most operate exit or guard relays exclusively or within a single /16 network block. Such operators can not become the first and last hop of your tor circuits, but they might be able to reveal your guard relay (when they act as the middle and exit relay in a single circuit).

Biggest Relay Families on the Tor Network

Relays are aggregated based on effective families. Effective families are relays with a mutually configured MyFamily setting. Single relays (without family) are also considered but not aggregated. The first column usually shows the contact information, or if no contact information was provided, the first 8 characters of the relay fingerprint.

Top 10 Exit Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Exit(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 11.4 33 2016-01-25
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 6.51 12 2016-12-23
tor@ipredator.se - 1Q3mjKbZwZFEigC8edUZ8ywX4QD7kxF 3.46 1 2014-04-19
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 2.94 11 2017-12-05
Viktor <vnikolov AT vnikolov dot cz> 2.85 11 2016-08-26
0x02225522 Frenn vun der Enn FVDE <info AT enn D 2.59 5 2014-04-09
https://www.digitale-gesellschaft.ch/abuse/ 2.26 7 2013-07-10
apx <kenan@sly.mn> - 114x2PzqXhfPjQUMVqkcpi8DZN9du 2.14 3 2014-11-04
0x9F29C15D42A8B6F3 Nos oignons <adminsys@nos-oigno 2 6 2014-04-08
DFRI <tor AT dfri dot se> - 1Muz37TfXVBiJKRJkAqTNo 2 5 2011-10-06

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Top 10 Guard Families

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
tor at 0x3d dot lu - 1x3dG3utS7FDrTtJutnR3zuCo4Z8f 1.77 6 2014-04-22
Felix <zwiebel ta quantentunnel tod de> 1.64 16 2015-10-10
https://onioncount.github.io/ https://onionpop.g 1.63 5 2016-08-10
poiuty@protonmail.com - 1YWqF3SGnQMkwgfGasrNmYv1XG 1.01 1 2017-12-22
poiuty@protonmail.com - 1YWqF3SGnQMkwgfGasrNmYv1XG 0.99 3 2016-01-26
god AT universe.org 0.96 2 2016-10-22
0x9501B909 Random Person <deep.thought AT riseup d 0.92 7 2017-02-20
info omuravpn.com 0.89 5 2017-01-05
Servbr Admin <servbr AT mail DOT md> 0.88 11 2016-04-10
<roottor00@splitdna.com> - 1LLnvMu2s4BaF2LmsqV8Ru 0.83 1 2014-04-08

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Top 10 Relay Families by Consensus Weight

Contact or Fingerprint (truncated) CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays First Seen
abuse@to-surf-and-protect.net 2.742 11.4 0 33 2016-01-25
https://www.torservers.net/donate.html <support .A 1.566 6.51 0 12 2016-12-23
sirmatt ksu edu 0x94FBBB0A https://onioncount.gith 1.145 1.52 0.3 8 2015-06-01
https://onioncount.github.io/ https://onionpop.g 1.034 0.37 1.63 7 2016-08-10
Viktor <vnikolov AT vnikolov dot cz> 0.856 2.85 0.37 14 2016-01-26
tor at 0x3d dot lu - 1x3dG3utS7FDrTtJutnR3zuCo4Z8f 0.833 0 1.77 7 2014-04-22
tor@ipredator.se - 1Q3mjKbZwZFEigC8edUZ8ywX4QD7kxF 0.832 3.46 0 1 2014-04-19
0ED0EA32 0.794 0 0 5 2017-10-24
Felix <zwiebel ta quantentunnel tod de> 0.755 0 1.64 19 2015-05-16
Accessnow.org <abuse .AT. accessnow .DOT. org> 0.709 2.94 0 11 2017-12-05

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Top 10 Autonomous System Names by CW Fraction

AS Name CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
OVH SAS 17.19 20.17 7.12 503
Online S.a.s. 9.64 11.12 12.59 377
Hetzner Online GmbH 5.68 8 0 278
DigitalOcean, LLC 5.47 6.62 1.82 316
Host Europe GmbH 2.08 3.17 0 35
NForce Entertainment B.V. 1.35 0.38 4.66 16
SOFTplus Entwicklungen GmbH 1.26 0.16 4.73 19
SURFnet bv 1.26 0.12 0.94 12
ISPpro Internet KG 1.05 2.26 0 29
Hurricane Electric, Inc. 1.04 0.8 2.83 15

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Tor Version Distribution (Relays)

Major Versions

Tor Version CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
0.3.1 39.5 33.38 38.78 1967
0.3.2 30.9 44.2 29.78 1412
0.2.9 13.2 9.6 14.83 1133
0.3.0 5.8 4.19 5.34 353
0.2.5 5.5 4.26 6.22 523
0.2.7 1.6 0.44 1.72 264
0.2.4 1.5 0.71 2.35 263
0.3.3 1.2 2.9 0.73 21
0.2.6 0.1 0.03 0.14 39
0.2.8 0.1 0.24 0.05 43

A version-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

Complete list of Tor Versions

End-of-Life Relays Share

The following table shows how many relays run a tor version that is no longer supported.

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Exit(%) #Relays
3.35 4.23 1.19 566

Show all relays running unsupported tor releases

OS Distribution (Relays)

OS CW Fraction(%) Exit(%) Guard(%) #Relays
Linux 89.5 90.4 91.6 5587
BSD 10.1 9.5 7.9 295
Windows 0.2 0 0.1 106
SunOS 0 0 0.1 4
Darwin 0 0 0 10

A OS-distribution-over-time graph (by relay count) can be found on the Torproject Metrics page

IPv6 Relay Stats

What cw fraction / guard/middle/exit probability has an IPv6 ORPort?

CW Fraction(%) Guard(%) Middle(%) Exit(%) #Relays
18.84 21.28 13.32 23.72 579

What exit probability allows IPv6 exiting?

Exit(%) #Exit Relays
29.54 131

Bridge Stats

Bridge Transports Distribution

Supported Transports Bridges
obfs4 1096
None 595
obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 247
obfs3, obfs4 58
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit, websocket 21
obfs3 18
obfs2, obfs3 10
obfs3, scramblesuit 9
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4 8
fte, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 5
meek 5
scramblesuit 3
fte, obfs3, obfs4 2
obfs2, obfs3, obfs4, scramblesuit 2
obfs4, scramblesuit 2
fte, meek, meek, obfs3, scramblesuit 1
fte, obfs3 1
fte, obfs4 1
fte, obfs4, websocket 1
meek, obfs4 1
websocket 1

Data Source

OrNetStats uses public data provided by The Tor Project: